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On the bases of game theory, this paper analyzed the investment game 
behaviors between central government and local governments and those among local 
governments, wishing to optimize the government investment mechanism, regulate 
the government investment behaviors and to improve the performance of 
government investments. The research revealed that: 
In planned economic system, differences of interests between local and central 
governments were very vague as the former actually has no independent status for 
economic behaviors. So, game behaviors of investments between local and central 
governments in this period had following specifications: 1) no policy-related gaming 
behaviors of investments; 2) major gaming methods for local governments were 
competing and casting off; 3) twist effect of regional industrial structure had been 
caused by gaming. Although local governments did not compete directly, they gamed 
and crowded when asking for investments from central governments for national 
economic planning. 
Local governments had achieved a comparatively independent status for 
economic behaviors in the process of transitional period. The objectives of 
investment behaviors of local governments would not always be in accordance with 
central government because of their own interests; therefore the equilibrium 
consequence of gaming would change, causing results such as overheating 
investments by local governments, overlapping investments and irrational 
investment structures, etc. This paper mainly analyzed the following games of 
governmental investment behaviors in transitional period: Firstly, on the basis of the 
game model of Zhang Weiyin (2004), this paper utilized subsidies (or taxations) for 
investments in infrastructures by central to local governments to analyze the effect of 
regulation and control of central government in different fields of investments. 
Research findings showed the policy of such subsidies (or taxations) would fail 














utilized a three-stage dynamic model of games under incomplete information to 
analyze investment gaming by central and local governments in transition period to 
cover the shortage of static model of games under complete information, and 
explained the investment impulsion and efforts of macroeconomic regulations and 
controls by central government in periods of transition. In addition, this paper 
utilized common agency model to analyze gaming of investment behaviors among 
the central government, local governments and local interest groups. It was found 
that the decisions local governments made are influenced by the other two. Finally, 
this paper analyzed gaming behaviors of local governments in different types of 
governmental investments. Research findings showed that strategic interactive 
behaviors of comparison did exist among local governments with different levels in 
various investment fields. 
The main innovations of this paper are as follows: 1) this paper divided the 
game problem about governmental investment behaviors into a number of 
sub-problems from the dimensionality of time and investor, and analyzed each 
sub-problem using game theory. 2) This paper combined both micro and macro level 
analyses. In micro level, this paper regarded central government and local 
governments as rational behavioral agent and constructed investment game model by 
use of game theory, and then analyzed games in different period and between 
different investors. In macro level, this paper not only gave descriptive statistics to 
the central government investment and local government investment, but also gave 
empirical analysis to the output from game model utilizing macro economy data. 3) 
Taking use of spatial panel data model, this paper tested and compared the spillover 
effect of different investment among local governments. Basing on the empirical 
analysis output of game model and combining the comparative analysis of overseas 
experiences, this paper gave policy suggestions on regulating investment behaviors 
of our governments. 
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控措施就是于 2008 年 11 月推出的“四万亿”投资计划。 
“四万亿”投资计划对我国 2009 年上半年的经济复苏起到了重要推动作
用。国家统计局数据显示，2009 年 1~5 月我国城镇固定资产投资 53520 亿
元，比增 32.9%，为 2004 年 5 月以来 快增速，与上年同期相比高出 7.3 个百
分点。2009 年 1~5 月累计社会消费品零售总额 48770 亿元，比增 15.0%。扣除





























经济运行情况》，2009 年上半年，全国新开工高速公路建设项目 111 个，建设
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